The End of the House of Saud

Peter Turchin (who I seem to quote a bit) had a piece from a few years ago about the high likely hood of the collapse of the Saudi Arabia.  Given that many people’s post apocalyptic scenario involves peak oil, this should be a matter of some interest.

One of the hallmarks of a mature discipline is its ability to make predictions thatcan be used to test scientific theories…

The specific case study I develop is the possible state collapse in Saudi Arabia. The theoretical setting is provided by the demographic-structural theory of state collapse. The starting point is a previously developed model for political cycles in agrarian societies with nomadic elites, loosely based on the ideas of Ibn Khaldun. I modify the model to fit the characteristics of the modern Saudi Arabian state and estimate its parameters using data from published sources. The model predicts that the sovereign debt of Saudi Arabia will reach unmanageable proportions some 5- 20 years in the future; the fiscal collapse will be followed by a state collapse in short order.

The core of the theory, as it is currently formulated (Turchin 2003: Chapter 7, following Goldstone I call it the demographic-structural theory), concerns the relationship between population growth and fiscal stability of the state. Briefly, population growth in excess of the productivity gains from the land leads to persistent inflation and rising real costs, which outstrip the ability of the state to increase tax revenues. Rapid expansion of population also results in an increased number of aspirants for elite positions, putting further fiscal strains on the state, and intensifying intra-elite competition and factionalism. Increased rural misery, urban migration, and falling real wages lead to frequent food riots and wage protests; expansion of youth cohorts contributes to the population mobilization potential; and elite competition and popular discontent fuel ideological conflicts. As all these trends intensify, the end result is state bankruptcy and consequent loss of military control; elite movements of regional and national rebellion; and a combination of elite-mobilized and popular uprisings that manifest the breakdown of central authority (Goldstone 1991:25).

Scientific Prediction in Historical Sociology: Ibn Khaldun meets Al Saud1

Peter Turchin University of Connecticut, December 11, 2003.

The primary variables appear to be:

• Outside influences
• Cutting budget deficits
• Reducing population growth
• Asset sell-off

He includes liberalization of political system: but not that it is unclear how this would change the underlying system.

What is particularly ironic is that this one scenario that exacerbates the peak oil situation, is somewhat alleviated by it as well.  Peak oil drives the higher oil prices that allow the House of Saud to stay in power. Turchin's basis for oil prices in 2003 was around $30/ barrel; a price that we have been exceeding fairly regularly since then.

Oddly enough in the same time period, and apparently independently, a Robert Baer at the Atlantic, was writing about "The Fall of the House of Saud"- go figure.

What is even odder, is that in addition to outlining lots of political cronyism on the part of American politicians, he also outlines almost exactly the same scenario (too many princes) as Turchin.

From Robert Baer’s The Fall of the House of Saud

Americans have long considered Saudi Arabia the one constant in the Arab Middle East—a source of cheap oil, political stability, and lucrative business relationships. But the country is run by an increasingly dysfunctional royal family that has been funding militant Islamic movements abroad in an attempt to protect itself from them at home. A former CIA operative argues, in an article drawn from his new book, Sleeping With the Devil, that today's Saudi Arabia can't last much longer—and the social and economic fallout of its demise could be calamitous...

The House of Saud currently has some 30,000 members. The number will be 60,000 in a generation, maybe much higher. According to reliable sources, anecdotal evidence, and the Saudi gossip machine, the royal family is obsessed with gambling, alcohol, prostitution, and parties. And the commissions and other outlays to fund their vices are constant. What would the price of oil have to be in 2025 to support even the most basic privileges—for example, free air travel anywhere in the world on Saudi, the Saudi national airline—that the Saudi royals have come to enjoy? Once the family numbers 60,000, or 100,000, will there even be a spare seat for a mere commoner who wants to fly out of Riyadh or Jidda? Reformers among the royal family talk about cutting back the perks, but that's a hard package to sell.

Saudi Arabia operates the world's most advanced welfare state, a kind of anti-Marxian non-workers' paradise. Saudis get free health care and interest-free home and business loans. College education is free within the kingdom and heavily subsidized for those who study abroad. In one of the world's driest spots water is almost free. Electricity, domestic air travel, gasoline, and telephone service are available at far below cost. Many of the kingdom's best and brightest—the most well-educated and, in theory, the best prepared for the work world—have little motivation to do any work at all...

Not all the wishing in the world will change the basic reality of the situation.

* Saudi Arabia controls the largest share of the world's oil and serves as the market regulator for the global petroleum industry.

* No country consumes more oil, and is more dependent on Saudi oil, than the United States.

* The United States and the rest of the industrialized world are therefore absolutely dependent on Saudi Arabia's oil reserves, and will be for decades to come.

* If the Saudi oil spigot is shut off, by terrorism or by political revolution, the effect on the global economy, and particularly on the economy of the United States, will be devastating.

* Saudi oil is controlled by an increasingly bankrupt, criminal, dysfunctional, and out-of-touch royal family that is hated by the people it rules and by the nations that surround its kingdom.

Signs of impending disaster are everywhere, but the House of Saud has chosen to pray that the moment of reckoning will not come soon—and the United States has chosen to look away. So nothing changes: the royal family continues to exhaust the Saudi treasury, buying more and more arms and funneling more and more "charity" money to the jihadists, all in a desperate and self-destructive effort to protect itself.

Resources Depletion and Demographics

A very common concern going forward is resource depletion .  However there is another ongoing concern that will act in synergy with this problem, and at other points will work against it.

That problem is global demographic shifts.  As Europe and Japan grow older, the “developing” world is relatively young and continuing to grow.  Even China, with its one child policy, is so young that its population will probably continue to grow for another 20 years.  It is estimated that that will add another 160 million people over the next 20 years (roughly half the US population today) and the much more quickly growing India would gain 170 million people within that time frame.

To continue the discussion I will quote Jack Goldstone in   Flash Points and Tipping Points: Security Implications of Global Changes

[F]our major trends that are likely to pose significant security challenges to Europe, Japan, and

most other developed nations in the next two decades:

1.    Disproportionate population growth in large and Muslim countries;

2.    Shrinking population in the European Union and European former Soviet countries;

3.    Sharply opposing age shifts between aging developed countries and youthful developing countries; and

4.    Increased immigration from developing to developed countries.

The security and conflict problems caused by population growth are not mainly due to shortages of resources. Rather, population distortions— in which populations grow too young, or too fast, or too urbanized—make it difficult for prevailing economic and administrative institutions to maintain stable socialization and labor force absorption (Goldstone, 2002; Cincotta et al., 2003; Leahy et al., 2007).

This slowdown in population growth has major implications for overall economic growth (Eberstadt, 2001). The economies of aging nations will not be stimulated by growing numbers of consumers and demand for housing. The capital growth generated by larger generations of young people approaching their peak earning years and saving for retirement will cease as well. Even if the growth of Europe’s income per capita remained constant, its overall economic growth rate would be cut in half as the population declines over the next 30-50 years.

An overall growth rate this small allows few margins for accumulation to invest for the future. As Benjamin Friedman (2005) has argued, substantial growth rates allow more groups to share to some degree in growth, and provide social resources for a variety of services and investments. Overall growth rates below 2 percent per year, by contrast, allow for little redistribution or investment, and tend to heighten social conflicts over such issues as pensions, migration, and labor/employer relations— situations we might see as the global economic downturn progresses.

The declining advanced economic countries are going to have very low growth already because of declining demand (population), but a decline in population is how countries, empires, etc. got broke out of the Malthusian squeeze prior to the industrial revolution.  Even if the size of the pie stayed the same, their was less people to share it.  So the slices got bigger.

But the developing countries are going to be in an extreme bind,  their increasing population would normally increase demand and drive production.  But the energy/resource costs will be increasing.  This is very much a Malthusian scenario in its negative phase.  Countries, empires, etc. prior to the industrial revolution would see people at the individual level get poorer.  Unfortunately, simply because there was less money per person, did not mean there was less money overall.  The surplus was very likely to be fought over by the elites, and in very early empires (Rome) it was often a driving force for expansion.  You made the pie bigger by taking away the surplus from some other group of elites.


The threat of nuclear warfare will probably limit some scenarios.  But access to resources/energy is going to become even more important.  The New York Times had a recent article stating that our military was upset that the Chinese military saw us in adversarial terms: not potentially cooperative.  Do you think the Chinese military is possibly looking a little more clearly into the future?

The Homestead Solution

One response to various global energy/global warming crises is homesteading and/or local food production.

There are a number of efficiency issues with this solution.  However, on a basic numbers level it looks fairly reasonable: at least at the level of the individual.   A family of four can easily feed itself on an acre of land: an acre being originally determined by  the amount of land that one ox can plow in a day using intensive farming/gardening methods.

But simply tallying the expected annual calorie output per acre versus the calorie input per person is not going to get you the whole story.  The last time period that the United States worked at non-mechanical intensive farming methods was during the late 19th to early 20th century. It can be instructive to look at the historical record.

The homesteads were small grants of free land from the public domain for people willing to bring them under cultivation, was developed by 19th-century reformers as a cure for social problems and corrupt land speculation.

The five year success rate from 1900 to 1915 was just below 40% (344,444/893,111=38.6%).  link

Three problem areas:

·         Issues of sociology/group dynamics

·         Issues of Scale combined with

·         Issues of variable output

You don’t think of group dynamics as being an issue with farming, but it is important to realize that farming communities develop over time and in a specific geography, and that instanting farming communities are not always going to be viable.

[In Canada ] Jewish settlers established agricultural settlements in the Canadian Prairie Provinces from the early 1880s through the first decade of the 20th century. Without exception these settlements were eventually abandoned by their founders. Today there are no Jewish rural agricultural communities in western Canada. ..Jewish pioneers abandoned their farms when they were unable to reconcile the demands of religious observance with the dispersed pattern of settlement mandated by the Dominion Lands Act of 1872. Poor coordination of aid by Jewish philanthropic institutions and their failure to strive for the concentration of Jewish colonization in a single geographic area exacerbated the social and religious problems faced by rural Jewish settlers. For many, relocation to a Jewish urban community was the only way to remain observant to Jewish religious law.

[By comparison, Mormon groups were in general successful]… characterized by its great stability. .. A comparative analysis of the two groups suggests that this difference in agricultural stability may not have been a reflection of prior experience, nor was it necessarily attributable to vagaries of the physical environment. Social structures, religious demands, and institutional backing, along with the geographical concentration and inter connectivity of settlements were critical elements in determining success or failure in agriculture colonization.

JEWISH AND MORMON AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENT IN WESTERN CANADA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS by Yossi Katz, John C. Lehr2  link2 and link3

There were underlying issues of variable output due to periodic adverse weather, and the misunderstanding of the appropriate measures needed to farm in the Upper Great Plains (Great American Desert).

As American settlements pushed further west past the 100th meridian, dry farming techniques were promoted that were designed to deal with the dryer climate found in the area.

Unfortunately the lack of accurate information led the Great Plains to be settled too densely in farms that were later found to be too small, undercapitalized and insufficiently diversified to be sustainable.  The initial problems were found to occur in Western Kansas when droughts in the 1890s reduced homesteads from a peak of 3,083 to a low point of 907 with only very slow growth into the 20th century.  But at the same time farm sizes doubled from 221 acres to 461 by 1900.  link4

Eventually these issues were worked out, but they worked out into the form of our modern agriculture system:  the result that todays homesteaders/local farm producers are trying to get away from.