Skirmishing With Light Arms 4: Into the Modern

We are going to start with the following discussion [Long Range Combat] from The Scrapboard

There are times when a Soldier may have the opportunity to fire at ranges greater than 500m. However, there is a difference between sniping at an unsuspecting foe or suppressive fire at an area and combat shooting. In Combat shooting the enemy is aware he is a target and acting accordingly.

To understand intermediate rounds, let's put them in their historical context:-

 The idea of intermediate rounds (optimized for 500m or less) is usually portrayed as a German wartime concept. In actuality the contract for development of the 7.92x33mm round was placed in 1934 and it was apparent during the First World War that shots at more than 400yds were very rare. The usual explanation you'll see for a 500m range being selected is that in most of the world visibility and terrain prevents shooting at greater ranges. Since MGs and snipers routinely shoot at greater ranges this accepted and often repeated explanation is obviously wrong!

 By 1942 the German army was very familiar with alpine and desert fighting and it is very “un-Germanic” that these experiences would not have been figured into development of the intermediate rounds.

My theory is this.

It is Tactical Accuracy not visibility that is the limiting factor.

 A 7.92mm or lesser bullet takes around a second to reach 600m. In that time an AWARE target can sprint 5-9m :- you don't know which direction he will take and he'll often be darting between cover. Your chance of hitting him with a single aimed shot is virtually random.

 I think most shooting was less than 500m because most German riflemen knew there was little point shooting beyond this unless the foe didn't know you were there or you could fill an area of about 10m with bullets.

A couple of friends confirm this with more recent experiences:-

“DOD did the same kinds of studies for all kinds of terrain, same result/conclusions; usual infantry engagement was 300 yards or less (didn't matter what you were armed with, typical infantry could not get hits at greater than 300m unless shooting volleys in mass or using machine guns.

 I was a former USMC National Match M-14 shooter and I can testify that even then the average infantryman was not going to get hits beyond 300m.) If you are under 1000m you call company or battalion mortars or MGs or Mark 19 (full auto grenade launcher), artillery and air strikes are for better targets that are further off. The point is correct on not firing individual weapons at longer than 300m, you won't kill them and they can call fire down on you!”

An ex-ranger
 “If you sight a target element that far away it is much more tactically feasible to call in artillery fire or an air strike thus saving your infantry the suicidal need for a half mile movement to contact. If you don't have fire support it is better to get closer before engagement to limit your targets tactical options. 500 to 700 meters gives them room to do just about anything, especially if you have let them know you were there by shooting at them from that distance. They may HAVE fire support!!”

He includes this chart from Jane's Infantry Weapons 1976 that reinforces the above discussion: 80% of shooting takes place at 220m, and 90% at about 310m.

This gets us some ways, except that our discussion is not on large battlefield tactical maneuvers, but irregular (Small war) tactics.  But it does point out that if you are a somewhat normal shooter, when firing at a distance, YOU GET ONE SHOT.  Then everyone ducks for cover, and if you are at range much beyond 200m, you are very unlikely to hit anything.  Thus automatic, versus semi-automatic, versus bolt action is not terribly important on these long range shots.

So let us continue with some other thoughtful people’s observations:

David Spaulding in What Really Happens In A Gunfight? spoke to ~200 people and interviewed them on their experience in a gunfight: including military, lawmen, and legally armed civilians. Paraphrasing some of his findings:

Often individuals were “surprise” by the situation, and were slow to react.

People who went into the situation (generally lawmen or military men on a specific type of operation) were generally least likely to be surprised.

Often people did not use the sights on their weapons.  Two groups generally did sight their weapons before firing.   Those who were not surprised and those with long arms, and those with revolvers.  Revolvers often have a larger, easier to see sight than automatic pistols, rifles by training are fired from the shoulder and it is natural to look down the sight when firing.

In a study he cites, in data base of lawmen who won their fight:  the hit ratio was 62%, not the more frequently cited 18% of other studies.

To turn to a study that was made into a book:  Gavin De Becker’s Just 2 Seconds.  In his study of attempted and successful assassination attempts he notes the following: 

for most types of attacks, 25-feet of space between attacker and target just about assure the protectee’s survival.

It should be noted, that while most assassinations in the U.S. occur with handguns (Southerners like their rifles a little more) , in foreign countries the use of long arms is more common.  So the 25' rule is not completely about the type of weapon used, it is also about the ability of the target to run or hide, and the ability of bystandards and guards to interfere.

We are going to further expand and discuss some of theese items a bit later.

Skirmishing With Light Arms 3 - The long Shot

To complete our example of the Native Americans we will again use (some of ) the examples from Alexander Rose’s “ American Rifle "'

Starting in the German Mountains:

…The plain muskets could be produced without anywhere near as much  care, they were simply much cheaper than rifles.

Hunters, however found rifling a boon, for in the rugged and echoey Alps they could use rifles to stalk bears, stags, and chamois from as far as two-hundred yards away-a range at which a musket was virtually ineffective.  While amid the chasms and atop the peaks, swirling wind eddies wreaked havoc with regular bullet’s trajectory and velocity, with a rifle an experienced hunter could achieve a one-shot kill by compensating for the wind.  As early as 1487 shooters were competing in target competitions (p15).

Then after lengthy explanation of the German rifle makers coming to Pennsylvania and the eventual dispersion of the rifle to the Indians; by the British to get their help against the French.

Finally:

Indians admired the rifles as ideal hunting weapons and objects of status, but they also quickly recognized that rifles represented their best shot at freedom. In his report of 1764 discussing British Indian policy Colonel John Bradstreet astutely divined the native Americans’ desire for rifles: “ All the Shawanese and Delawar Indians are furnished with rifled barrel guns, of an excellent king, and that the upper Nations are getting into them fast, by which, they will be less dependent upon us, as account of the great saving of powder, this gun taking much less, and the shot much more certain, than any other gun, and in their way of carrying on war, by far more prejudicial to us, than any other sort”…

Frontiersmen popularized the term “skulking” to describe the Indian reliance on “ambushments, sudden surprises, or overmatching some of our small companies with greater numbers, having had many times six or seven to one”….the Indians subjected them to nighttime and dawn raids, as well as surprise attacks during thunderstorms and fog.

Wilderness fighting favored the fleety, camouflaged, loosely organized bands of men traveling light and adeptly using trees, ravines, and rocks to pick their targets and snipe at the enemy before scuttling to another hiding place.   The Indians’ favored strategy was to dispatch scouts to detect approaching enemies, then ambush them in a vulnerable position, such as alongside a river or along a path  passing  through a ravine. Upon deducing the enemies weaknesses, Indian bands executed a complicated series of tactical maneuvers to deploy into a “half-moon” formation that would flank the unfortunates and pick them off.

Such attacks nearly always occurred from a distance, using rifles or bows, for it was a rash chief who engaged trained soldiers in hand-to-hand fighting (p27).

Native American warfare avoided pitched battles in favor of low-level insurgencies that inflicted relatively few casualties but dragged on for years, tiring out nervous settlers, wearying militiamen with constant call-outs, and exhausting government treasuries unable to afford the cost of maintaining a permanent professional force for protection (p26).

As an aside, the Indians were adept at close in fighting, but were wise to avoid bayonet-armed infantry when they met them. 

I think the author also is missing the fact that the typical fighting between settlers and Indians only involved a few thousand people on each side.  Thus the Indians consistently fought in a manner that would cause them the least amount of causalities.  It is probably the type of warfare they wagged between themselves, and so any wearing affect on their enemy’s treasury was incidental.

They are using effective long knives, and tomahawks at close range, and rifles to keep a distance when they have no advantage.

Skirmishing with Light Arms 2

I have yet to see discussion of this type of situation in your typical list of "Best Weapons for Survival" that one see posted frequently.

from: Indian Warfare, Household Competency, and the Settlement of the Western Virginia Frontier, 1749 to 1794 by John M. Boback link

The settlers in the Greenbrier Valley [now in West Virginia] suffered a particularly devastating blow in the summer of 1763 when a war party of sixty Shawnees infiltrated the settlements. Under the leadership of Chief Cornstalk, the warriors used a tactic whereby they approached a cabin, feigned friendship, and then attacked by surprise. First turning their attention to the settlers living along Muddy Creek, the Shawnees killed Frederick See and Felty Yocum along with their families. In addition, they took “many others” captive. According to Withers in his Chronicles of Border Warfare, the Shawnees had divided into smaller bands and “visited” the various cabins simultaneously. Doing so would have limited the chances of word getting out that an attack was underway.

Cornstalk’s warriors then turned their attention toward the settlements at the “Big Levels” located at present Lewisburg. Upon discovering that most if not all of the one hundred or so settlers in the area had assembled for a feast at the home of Archibald Clendenin, the Shawnees apparently approached the cabin as a single large body. Again feigning friendship, the warriors joined in the festivities that included feasting on three elk that Clendenin had just recently killed. Quite possibly, these Shawnees had chanced upon some sort of communal work activity such as a cabin raising. Regardless, the Shawnees eventually ended their charade by killing or capturing all but one of the settlers. The sole escapee, Conrad Yocum, apparently suspecting treachery had left the gathering under the pretense of needing to hobble his horse. Once out of sight, he preserved his life by fleeing eastward across the mountains.

In your typical TEOTWAWKI book, the good guys sit in some carefully laid out fortification and get to blast the bad in one big penultimate battle.  The reality is a little different.  The series of "wars" gets confusing, but it is to be remembered that the settlers were driven out of their settlements back over the Alleganies a number of time (3 total I believe) and some of these wars went on for twenty years.  In most of these situation, people would pack up and head back over the mountains in panic.  But not everyone:

Those settlers who remained in the back country defended themselves through a combination of county militias and constructing refuge forts to be used as places of respite during times of danger. Naturally, it was to the settlers’ advantage if they could discover ahead of time when a war party was about to enter their vicinity. To provide this advanced warning, militia scouts, also known as “Indian spies,” constantly patrolled the forest looking for signs of enemy activity. Upon discovering footprints or other evidence, the scouts tried to ascertain the size of the party, their tribal affiliation, their most probable route, and whether they had hostile intentions.

If the situation warranted it, the scouts sent news of the incursion to the nearest militia commander. In hopes of averting disaster, scouts “would fly from Fort to Fort and give the alarm” warning nearby settlers of impending danger. One man who grew up on the western frontier recalled how his family was “sometimes waked up in the dead of night” by runners telling everyone to fort up. His father would immediately grab his gun and powder horn while the rest of the family got dressed. Everyone tried to be as quiet as possible and took the “greatest care . . . not to awaken the youngest child.” Without lighting a candle, the family grabbed what “articles of clothing and provision” they could. Oftentimes, they had no choice but to walk to the fort “for there was no possibility of getting a horse in the night.” By sunrise, all of his neighbors had also arrived at the fort. Then over the course of the day, armed parties of men visited each homestead to pick up additional food, clothing, valuables, and other supplies that might be needed at the fort.

How long a family remained at a refuge fort could vary. While some families stayed for only short periods before returning home, others remained there for months. Noise, crowded living conditions, disease, and concerns over unguarded homesteads could make forting an unpleasant experience.

The Indian Wars of the East and Alleghenies are not as well known today as the Western Wars because, with the exception of a brief "Daniel Boone" period, they were not as heavily represented in Hollywood or television depictions.  However,  they were often relatively successful

The recent massacres in Rwanda utilizing swords made of sheet metal (reportedly from car fenders) actually share some similar characteristics.  The killing is fast, and with the assailant so close at hand escape is difficult.

Skirmishing with Light Arms 1

The Eastern Native Americans had been known for their marksmanship.  They had preferred the slow loading rifles to the musket.  But hen the U.S. Cavalry faced the Plains Indians after the American Civil War they found a foe that fought in a very different foe.

From American Rifle by  Alexander Rose p 166.

In this instance the quickly organized defensive position held of the attack.  But the cavalrymen were having a hard time fending off the Indians swarming attacks with their single shot breach loading (similar in action to a break open shotgun) rifles.  The Indians preferred to use their lever action repeating rifles at point blank range:  much in the fashion of submachine gun.

Although not as relevant to skirmish fighting, cavalry during the civil war, particularly Confederate cavalry, adopted the heavy use of repeating pistols and short double barrel shotguns to replace the sabre in inter-cavalry skirmishes.

The acceptance of the pistol by American cavalry resulted in a tactic known as the "pistol Charge" in which cavalry attacked with drawn pistols.   Louis A DeMarco "War Horse"

The point is that, as they became available, multi-fire weapons were adopted by troops who were regularly involved in close range skirmish fighting.  As range increases, the value of accuracy over volume increase;  But in close "quantity has a quality all of its own"'.